Abstract. In this paper, we present efficient encryption scheme based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to protect patient's medical data in healthcare system. The proposed scheme used the symmetric cipher algorithm (i.e., DES, modified Feistel algorithm, etc.) to encrypt or decrypt sensitive patient's medical data, and then used ECC to manage the key's distribution, update and revocation.
Introduction
The privacy and security requirements for medical care are complex and scenario dependent. In addition to the general requirements of security in WSN, there have been three challenges to medical data security, briefly proposed in literature as follows [1] : ⅰ) How to ensure the privacy and integrity of the medical data, given that the wireless channel is easily subject to many forms of attack? ⅱ) How to ensure that only authorized people can access the data? The solution should scale to a large number of users (medical professionals, patients or relatives) and accommodate changes in the users. ⅲ) How to prevent someone from using captured sensors to recover sensitive medical information or inject false information?
This paper focuses on these challenges and intends to provide some contributions to solve the problem. In order to these problems, we choose the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which is one of the most famous asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. It has attracted considerable with the other widely used asymmetric cryptographic algorithm RSA. An elliptic curve Cryptosystem using a 160-bits key can provide the same security level with a 1024-bits RSA key [2] . We have applied symmetric algorithm to encrypt or decrypt patient's sensitive physiological data, and also use ECC to manage the key's distribution, update and revocation.
Propose scheme
A new encryption scheme based on ECC is presented in Fig. 1 . This scheme tries to use some symmetric algorithm to encrypt or decrypt some sensitive patient's medical data, and also use ECC to manage the key's distribution, update and revocation. This scheme combines the advantage of symmetric and asymmetric encryptions into a total scheme to fix the security issues in WBANs.
Notations and Assumptions
Before presenting the details of our scheme, we must outline some basic notations and assumptions seen in Table 1 and 2, used throughout this paper.
Table 1. Notations

T=(P, a, b, G, n, h)
P : The finite field in the elliptic curve a and b : elements in the finite field that the define the elliptic curve equation G : a point of the elliptic curve n : the order of the point G h : the divider of the number of elements of elliptic curve by n K SB The secret key of base station K PB The public key of base station K SN The secret key of sink node K PN The Table 2 . Assumptions
The 6-tuple T is shared by sink node and base station in WBANs. Base station establishes the Key Derivation Function (KDF), for KDF we use PBKDF2 with the option SHA-1. Base station establishes the MAC scheme, which is HMAC with the option SHA-1. Base station establish symmetric encryption scheme such as modified Feistel algorithm [3] . A sink node has more computational and communication ability than normal sensor node and it is a trusted and non-compromised node at which all legal sensors have to identify by it in advance. A sink node obtain in an authentic manner the selection made by base station that are the elliptic curve domain parameters T, key derivation function, the HMAC scheme and the symmetric encryption scheme.
Key Deployment, Encryption and Decryption Phase
The sink node encrypts messages using ECC using the keys and parameters and the detailed procedures of encrypting and decrypting are explained in Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1. Flow chart of proposed scheme
Analysis
Ensure that information is not altered by unauthorized persons. If the cipher text has been altered by unauthorized user from C to C' and then in decryption process the value is calculated other than D'. This alteration can be found at the time of verification process and the cipher text has been denied by base station to accept and hence integrity is ensured. To prevent man-in-the-middle attack, the sink node does not send the message containing his identity directly but in encrypted form of the data. So an adversary cannot decipher the text since he/she does not have private key of receiver which key pairs could be generated. Non-repudiation is the assurance that someone cannot deny something. That is sink node cannot deny that encrypted text is not sent by it. Any trust party or receiver himself can check that it is sent by the sink node by running the verification procedure through MAC code before decrypt the cipher text. Also, after using encryption and decryption algorithms, the outside eavesdropping can be prevented by transmitting cipher text and the inside attacker cannot modify, inject and spoof any fault message into the networks easily. However, the problem of replay attacks remains to be solved as a focus of future work.
Conclusion
In this work, efficient encryption method based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to protect patient's medical data in WBANs is proposed. This method used the symmetric cipher algorithm such as DES or modified Feistel algorithm to encrypt or decrypt sensitive patient's medical data and then use EDD to manage the key's distribution, update and revocation. ECC provides greater security and more efficient performance than the other cryptography techniques. Even though ECC which were used in our solution provide some valuable advantage s over other cryptosystems as RSA, the number of slightly different versions of ECC included in the standards may obstruct the adoption of ECC. In our future work, we try to update overall process which includes digital signature and mutual authentication phase detail. In addition, we will find some solution for secure communication between the wearable heterogeneous sensors and the sink node.
